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Abstract
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) have raised a great concern on privacy recently. A practi-
cal method to protect privacy is needed for adopting UAS in civilian airspace. This thesis examines
the privacy policies, filtering strategies, existing techniques, then proposes a new method based
on encrypted video stream and cloud-based privacy servers. In this scheme, all video surveillance
images are initially encrypted, then delivered to a privacy server. The privacy server decrypts the
video using the shared key with the camera, and filters the image according to the privacy policy
specified for the surveyed region. The sanitized video is delivered to the surveillance operator and
anyone on the Internet who is authorized. In a larger system composed of multiple cameras and
multiple privacy servers, the keys can be distributed using Kerberos protocol.
With this method the privacy policy can be changed on demand in real-time and there is no need
for a costly on-board processing unit. By utilizing cloud-based servers, advanced image processing
algorithms and new filtering algorithms can be applied immediately without camera software up-
grade. This method is cost-efficient and promotes video sharing among multiple subscribers, thus it
can spur wider adoption.
iii
Acknowledgements
First and foremost I express my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Yoohwan Kim for his excellent
guidance and assistance throughout my thesis. Without his ideas, advices and persistent help, this
thesis would not have been possible.
I would also like to thank Dr. Laxmi P. Gewali, Dr. Ajoy K. Datta and Dr. Pramen P. Shrestha
for their invaluable support. It is an honour to have them in my thesis committee. I am grateful to
my parents for their warm support in every phase of my life. Lastly, my greatest appreciation goes
to Binita Shakya for her untiring encouragement and motivation to complete my thesis.
Surendra Shrestha
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
May 2014
iv
Table of Contents
Abstract iii
Acknowledgements iv
Table of Contents v
List of Tables viii
List of Figures ix
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION TO UAS 1
1.1 Brief History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Classification of UAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2.1 High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.2 Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.3 Tactical UAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.4 Close Range UAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.5 Mini UAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.6 Micro UAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.7 Nano UAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Applications of UAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3.1 Military Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3.2 Civilian Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4 Advantages of UAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4.1 Dull Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4.2 Dirty Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4.3 Dangerous Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4.4 Covert Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4.5 Research Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
v
1.4.6 Economic Reasons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Chapter 2 PRIVACY CONCERNS 6
2.1 Privacy Issues with UAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Need for Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Chapter 3 RELATED WORK 10
3.1 Increasing visibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2 Geo-Fencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3 Blanking Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3.1 Need for an on-board map and processing system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3.2 Static privacy map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3.3 Non-compliant usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Chapter 4 PROPOSED SCHEME 14
4.1 Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2 Operating Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2.1 Camera certification and key assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2.2 Camera owner registers the privacy service subscription with the Privacy
Server (PS). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2.3 Key confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2.4 Privacy filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2.5 Sanitized video delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3 Cryptographic Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3.1 Data Encryption and Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Chapter 5 TYPES OF DATA AND MULTI-LEVEL PRIVACY 20
5.1 Navigation-Critical Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.2 Meta Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.3 Levels of Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Chapter 6 PRIVACY PROTECTION FILTERING 23
6.1 Static Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6.2 On-Demand Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6.3 Processed Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Chapter 7 GENERALIZED ARCHITECTURE 26
7.1 Encryption Key Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.2 Kerberos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7.2.1 Exchange of Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7.3 Video Subscription Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Chapter 8 ADVANTAGES 32
8.1 Flexible Privacy Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8.2 Separation of Camera from Image Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8.3 Legal Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8.4 Supporting Forensic Investigation for Privacy Violation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
8.5 Availability of the Video Streaming to a Larger Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Chapter 9 DISCUSSIONS 34
9.1 Need for Internet Connectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
9.2 Denial of Service attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Chapter 10 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 35
Bibliography 37
Vita 39
vii
List of Tables
5.1 Sample Privacy Policy Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.1 Summary of Kerberos Message Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
viii
List of Figures
1.1 Elements of an Unmanned Aircraft System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2.1 UAV Snooping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1 Geo-fencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2 Blanking Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1 UAS Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2 Interaction Among Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3 Block Cipher with CTR mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.1 Varying Levels of Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.1 Equivalent Video Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.2 Privacy Protection Request in Real Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7.1 Generalized Architecture with Multiple Cameras and Privacy Servers . . . . . . . . . 26
7.2 Key Registration at Kerberos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7.3 Key distribution in the field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
ix
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION TO UAS
An Unmanned Aircraft (UA) can be simply defined as an aircraft without a human pilot on-board
[1]. It is controlled either autonomously through the computer systems on the aircraft or by a human
operator with a remote control outside the aircraft. It is also known by many other names includ-
ing “drones”, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)”, “Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV)” and “Radio
Control (R/C) aircraft”. For a successful operation of an unmanned aircraft, an integration of a
number of other systems are required. An Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) is a system comprising
of the UA and any other elements that are essential for the safe operation of the UA. These elements
include control stations, communication data link, payloads, launch and recovery elements and the
human element [2]. Figure 1.1 shows the combination of all the elements to create an UAS.
Figure 1.1: Elements of an Unmanned Aircraft System
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1.1 Brief History
The concept of unmanned flight was first hypothesized by Nikola Tesla in the 1890s. Tesla shared
his concept of remote-controlled torpedoes with Elmer Sperry. In October 1917, US Navy granted
Sperry the first military contract for an unmanned flight system to develop an aerial torpedo. Sperry
developed six test aircrafts for the US Navy, however, the aircraft could not fulfill its purpose fully
though the models were launched successfully. The research on these aerial torpedoes were con-
ducted until 1926 under Sperry. A modified N9 Navy seaplane was the first successful unmanned
airplane to be flown by a radio remote control in September 1924 [3][4].
The US Army started its research on unmanned flight in 1918. In January 1918, Charles Kettering
constructed a prototype UAV known as the “Bug” for the Army. The Army ordered around 100
Bugs, but before they could be used, the war had already ended. [4]. The invention of UAV started
with its use in the battlefield and later it became an important tool for the US Army. The testing
for UAVs started at the end of the World War I, and the Second World War embarked a milestone
for its development. More than 15000 drones were built during that period for U.S. Military. The
British conducted an initial test of UAVs in water and later in the deserts of Iraq. In 1942, US
Navy conducted the test of UAVs that could carry weapons. During the 1940s, the UAVs were more
popularly known as drones [5].
In 1955, the Army started using UAVs for military observations to locate an enemy. The develop-
ment of High-altitude long-endurance (HALE) aerial vehicles started in 1968. The military UAS
technology was continuously developed during the 1970s and the 1980s by the United States, Rus-
sia, Israel and some other European countries [6]. Only in 1990, Federal Aviation Administration
approved the use of unmanned aircraft in national airspace for the first time [7]. The use of UAS
flourished for military and civilian applications since 2000. With the development of more advanced
technologies in computing, imaging and communication, the number of applications of UAS saw a
huge growth after this period.
1.2 Classification of UAS
UAS can be classified based on the range or altitude in which they operate [8].
2
1.2.1 High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE)
They operate in high altitude of over 15,000 m and generally have endurance of more than 24
hours. These are mostly used in military operations which require long range reconnaissance and
surveillance.
1.2.2 Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE)
They operate in between altitude of 5,000 m and 15,000 m and have endurance of about 24 hours.
These UAS are also able to operate in ranges of more than 500 km.
1.2.3 Tactical UAV
These UAVs operate at an altitude of around 5,500 m and have a range between 100 km and 300
km.
1.2.4 Close Range UAV
These UAVs generally operate at a range of 100 km.
1.2.5 Mini UAV
They operate at a range of about 30 km and are mostly used for civilian applications.
1.2.6 Micro UAV
These are generally launched by hand and have a wingspan of about 150 mm. They are generally
used for short range applications.
1.2.7 Nano UAV
These are tiny UAVs which are generally used in groups for very short range surveillance.
1.3 Applications of UAS
UAS have been used in a wide range of applications ranging from military to research and surveil-
lance. The use of UAS in various fields have been ever increasing, though its potential in many fields
is yet to be exploited and used to maximum [9]. Basically, their applications can be divided into 2
main categories [8].
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1.3.1 Military Applications
UAS have a lot of applications in army, navy or air force. Some of its applications in these fields
can be listed as:
• Relay radio signals
• Protect ports from attacks
• Enemy activity surveillance
• Locate and Destruct land mines
• Eliminate unexploded bombs
1.3.2 Civilian Applications
UAS can put into a large number of civilian applications, some of which are listed below:
• Aerial Photography
• Fire Detection and Control
• Crime Surveillance
• Crop Monitoring and Spraying
• Search and Rescue Operations
1.4 Advantages of UAS
UAS are designed to perform particular type of roles and they possess an advantage over manned
aircraft in these roles. UAS are basically suited for these type of operations [8].
1.4.1 Dull Operations
Some military or civilian operations require hours of continuous surveillance which is not possible
through manned aircraft. UAS are more effective in these type of dull operations as it is cheaper
and the ground-based operators can also work in shifts.
1.4.2 Dirty Operations
Monitoring environments such as nuclear clouds or chemical contamination can be highly hazardous
to human health. For these types of operations, UAS are safer and more effective to use.
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1.4.3 Dangerous Operations
Military Operations like reconnaissance over enemy territory are very dangerous to human lives.
Due to its smaller size and greater stealth, UAS are more suitable to use in these operations without
risking any human lives. Other examples of dangerous operations are forest fire control, operating
in extreme weather conditions, etc.
1.4.4 Covert Operations
UAS are highly suited for covert operations because of their small size and quietly operating capa-
bility. It is very difficult for enemy to detect these UAS.
1.4.5 Research Operations
UAS are used in aeronautical field to carry our tests for research purposes. Small UAS models of
larger manned aircraft are used to test various operations under realistic conditions.
1.4.6 Economic Reasons
UAS are cheap to operate and maintain. Because of this, it can be used in many civilian applications
like local surveillance or delivery of small packets.
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Chapter 2
PRIVACY CONCERNS
Privacy is a relatively broad term and there is no single definition to accommodate its various di-
mensions. There are several types of privacy, including “privacy of person, privacy of thought and
feelings, privacy of location and space, privacy of data and image, privacy of behavior (and action),
privacy of communication, and privacy of association including group privacy” [10]. Privacy is a
subjective concept and different people react differently to it. It also varies by society or by era or
generation. A privacy-invading incident may be perfectly acceptable for some, but it may be totally
unacceptable to others. This complexity requires a method to apply different types of privacy pro-
tection mechanisms rather than one uniform strategy.
Right to privacy is one of our fundamental rights. The surveillance in public places and even in
private places has decreased the degree of freedom and liberty. With the new emerging technologies,
the right to privacy and data protection has been an important concern [11]. The right to data
protection can be defined as “the individual’s right to exercise a significant measure of control over
the collection, use, and disclosure of one’s own personal information” [12].
2.1 Privacy Issues with UAS
One of the most useful applications of UAS is video surveillance. UAs can be equipped with powerful
cameras that are able to take high-resolution pictures and videos of the geographic locations below
[13]. R/C airplanes have raised some privacy concerns in the past. But their effect is generally
limited for a few reasons. They fly under 400 feet with direct control under the operator within Line
of Sight (LOS). Thus the operators are visible, and the attempt of privacy invasion can be easily
spotted. UAs are much more capable than R/C airplanes, flying farther distance, possibly beyond
line-of-sight (BLOS).
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The surveillance image can be consumed by the surveillance operator, stored for later use, or broad-
cast on the Internet in real-time. This ability of the UAs has raised privacy concerns among the
public [14][15][16]. For example, a UAS can take a video shot of people swimming in their back yard
pool, or people in their home through the window as illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: UAV Snooping
In particular, a video image streamed through the Internet in real-time can become available to
millions of people instantly. Once the image is published on the Internet, there is no way to turn it
back. Such inappropriate use of these technologies poses a serious threat to human rights for privacy
and suggests a need for protection against these intrusions into privacy [17].
2.2 Need for Privacy
The wide use of UAS has ensured safety and security, but at the same time, privacy has been an
important issue because of the surveillance from UAS. The regulations regarding the use of UAS
should address these privacy concerns related with UAS. Many studies have analyzed the impact on
privacy because of the use of UAS.
Cavoukian A. (2012) mentioned the necessity of addressing privacy while designing new technolo-
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gies, including drones. The study emphasized that the privacy issues in drone technologies can be
addressed by using “Privacy by Design (PbD)” framework. While using drones in public places,
the public should be well informed prior to its use to maintain privacy of public. The camera and
sensors in the drone should not collect information more than its required purpose [14].
Carr E. B. investigated privacy issues related with UAS and questioned Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA) on three important issues of UAS, such as command and control of UAS, detection
and recognition of other aircraft by UAS, and the privacy of individuals [6]. Villasenor J. also con-
ducted study in the origin of drones, regulatory and privacy issues related with the use of drones [3].
Many research and studies have been conducted to identify privacy related issues aroused from
emerging technologies [18]. Finn et al. (2013) examined the privacy impacts of new technologies.
Among various types of privacy, UAS have impacted “privacy of behavior and action, privacy of
data and image, privacy of location and space and privacy of association” [10].
In the recent years, the number of UAS being operated has risen greatly and is expected to rise
further in the coming years [3]. With the high quality video surveillance cameras being used in the
UAS to monitor the activities happening in the ground, the chance of inadvertent privacy invasion
is increasing. Night operation poses a greater threat, as it is nearly impossible to locate a UAS at
night due to its low visibility and silent operation, while it is now possible to view the night images
in high definition with full color instead of gray IR video [19].
Video surveillance is not a new concept. We are already living in a world where we are constantly
being watched [20]. There are CCTV cameras nearly in every public places, roads, campuses, bars,
bus stations, office buildings, etc. This prevalence of CCTV image has actually helped to track down
the suspects in Boston Marathon Bombing attack in 2013 [21]. There are Google Street View that
is available to the general public, and numerous satellite images in search engines such as Google or
Bing. However, all of those images are taken in public places and the chance of privacy violation
is low. In case of Google street view, the images are not available in real-time, and it is carefully
censored to blur the car plate numbers or people’s faces. In case of those image providers, tracking
the company violating the privacy law is not a problem, as it is readily available, in case there is
any privacy-violating incident.
However, in case of UAS, the surveillance operator is not easily traceable. The video can go viral
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instantly on the Internet as it happens, and worse, people responsible for this cannot be identified.
This is a serious threat to general public, and a number of states have already created anti-UAS
law reflecting the fear against the privacy invasion by UAS [22][23][24]. Without answering these
concerns in a trusted manner, both from policy/legal and technical side, a wide adoption of UAS
for civilian usage could be hampered.
9
Chapter 3
RELATED WORK
Although the privacy invasion is a serious threat from the UAS, there has been very few published
works on this topic. This section discusses possible solutions that are being discussed informally in
the research community.
3.1 Increasing visibility
One of the problems with UAS-based surveillance is that the public who is monitored is generally
unaware of it because of it low visibility. They are small, and they generate very low noise [2]. By
mandating a flashing light, and sound warning (e.g., beeping), people can become aware of them.
While taking video, additional warning may be given, like blinking red light similar to camcorder.
3.2 Geo-Fencing
Geo-fencing is a feature in a software program that uses the global positioning system (GPS) or ra-
dio frequency identification (RFID) to define geographical boundaries [25][26]. A geo-fence creates
a virtual barrier so that a moving object cannot enter or exit across the virtual wall. A geo-fence
can be a predefined set of boundaries, like school attendance zones or neighborhood boundaries, or
it could be dynamically generated. Figure 3.1 shows an example of geo-fencing.
The virtual fence can be set up through the co-ordinates of the GPS positions forming a polygonal
shape. A pre-defined location can be set up as the return point if the UAS crosses the boundary
[27]. The geo-fencing concept is not new in airspace control. Airplanes may not enter a restricted
airspace. The geo-fencing concept is now being applied to UAS in fine-grain [28].
However, the concept of geo-fencing may be too rigid for an efficient operation of UAS. Not all
privacy-protected airspace is a restricted airspace. It may require unnecessary detour. If a surveil-
lance region is surrounded by geo-fence, the region is not accessible even if it allows video surveillance.
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Figure 3.1: Geo-fencing
Therefore a softer alternative is desirable.
3.3 Blanking Technique
The blanking technique erases a certain portion of the video if the portion is privacy-protected.
The camera and the on-board processing system determine whether the region is protected, and, if
protected, blanks out the section of the video before transmitting the video to the ground station
(Figure 3.2). So an accidental release of the privacy-protected video is prevented as the decision is
made by the on-board processing unit before the surveillance operator can view it. This method
requires an on-board processor with a pre-loaded privacy map of the surveyed geographical region.
The privacy map contains detailed information about which region should be blanked out. Although
blanking technique is currently the most intuitive and viable solution, there are some shortcomings.
11
Figure 3.2: Blanking Technique
3.3.1 Need for an on-board map and processing system
This technique requires specialized maps and high-performance on-board computing system. While
it is not impossible, there are some undesirable consequences. The need for larger memory and
high-performance computing system increases the cost, which directly impacts the affordability of
the system and slows the adoption rate. Furthermore, those added equipment consumes more power
and reduce the battery life. The increased weight also reduces the speed, range, and flight duration
of the UA.
3.3.2 Static privacy map
The on-board privacy map is static and not updated in real-time. It is a snapshot of the privacy
requirements, and the map is frozen until next update. If a person spots a UAS flying and taking
a video over his house, there is no way to stop it because on-demand request in real-time is not
easily supported. Secondly, updating the map and on-board software is the responsibility of the
UAS operator. But with a large UAS fleet, it takes significant time and effort to update the privacy
maps and software in all UAs, and thus it may be neglected.
3.3.3 Non-compliant usage
Use of the blanking algorithm is purely voluntary. The operators can turn off the algorithm, and
take the video freely in the private regions. It is difficult to check whether the algorithm is being
12
used as required or audit it afterwards. Even if an audit can be done afterwards, the video may have
been already released to the public by the time it is audited. The lack of audit feature hurts not
only the subjects being surveyed, but also the surveillance operator. If there is any criminal charge
or lawsuit related to privacy against the operator, the operator needs to prove that the blanking
algorithm was properly used. This feature may not be possible.
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Chapter 4
PROPOSED SCHEME
The proposed scheme is a lightweight real-time privacy protection scheme with multiple levels of
privacy. This scheme uses a cryptographic process to encrypt the video from the UAS and decrypt
it at a trusted third party server. Since the privacy filtering operation is done in a powerful cloud-
based server on the ground, the UAS doesn’t need to carry sophisticated computing equipment
as in blanking technique. The privacy detection algorithm, privacy map, filtering software can be
upgraded separately from the camera system. Thus the same camera can be used for a longer period
without upgrading.
4.1 Architecture
The architecture is shown in Figure 4.1. The video taken by the UAS is always encrypted. Then
the surveillance operator’s equipment receives it, but it cannot decrypt the video because it does
not have the decryption key. It only relays the encrypted video to a privacy server.
The encrypted data is decrypted at a cloud-based privacy server, and analyzed based on the most
up-to-date privacy policy. After the filtering operation, the sanitized video is sent to the surveillance
operator. The privacy policy at the privacy server can be modified any time on demand. Any
privacy requirements and violation can be monitored and enforced in real-time at the server.
4.2 Operating Procedure
Figure 4.2 shows the operating sequence and the various interaction between different participants
of the system.
4.2.1 Camera certification and key assignment
The camera is equipped with a shared symmetric key with the privacy server. It is suggested that
the key should be stored in a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to avoid key theft. A TPM is a
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Figure 4.1: UAS Architecture
hardware device to store cryptographic information which provides higher security against external
software attack and physical theft. The IP address of the privacy server(s) is pre-configured in the
camera.
4.2.2 Camera owner registers the privacy service subscription with the Privacy Server
(PS).
After purchasing the camera, the owner creates an account and registers the camera ID.
4.2.3 Key confirmation
Upon powering up, the camera looks for the privacy server and they confirm proper communication.
The camera may operate in non-encryption mode before the connection with the server is made.
4.2.4 Privacy filtering
As the encrypted video image comes to the privacy server, the server decrypts it and looks up the
privacy policy for the surveyed region. As well as static filtering based on the location, a dynamic
filtering can be applied with image-processing algorithms or by human operator to filter out any
inappropriate video scenes.
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Figure 4.2: Interaction Among Participants
4.2.5 Sanitized video delivery
The resulting sanitized video is delivered to the surveillance operator or anybody with an authoriza-
tion.
4.3 Cryptographic Scheme
The 3-tier model (camera, surveillance station, privacy server) may look similar to 802.11i protocol
[29] where the Authenticator (access point) passes the message from the Supplicant (wireless client)
to the Authentication server (RADIUS). However, there is a fundamental difference. The video
stream from the UAS to the privacy server is a broadcast in essence. The privacy server doesn’t
need to authenticate any camera with hand-shaking sequence. The encrypted channel is already
pre-established with the shared key. The camera doesn’t need to authenticate the privacy server,
either. If the camera contacts a wrong privacy server, the data cannot be decrypted as the keys
do not match and thus privacy is not compromised. To explain the encryption process, different
entities are denoted as following.
• Surveillance Station = SS
• Privacy Server = PS
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There is no encryption between any entities at the data link layer.
• UAS → SS : Proprietary wireless channel (No encryption)
• SS → PS : Public Internet (No encryption)
The video stream is packetized and encrypted in the following format.
• V = [video data, sequence number, hash]
The sequence number identifies the video data from the UAS and the hash authenticates that the
video is coming from the right source.
The encrypted video data is delivered from UAS to the PS via SS. The SS packages is within an
IP packet, and sends it to the PS. SS is not part of the cryptographic process. It simply relays the
encrypted video stream to PS.
K is the shared key between UAS and PS. The encrypted video is decrypted at PS with the help
of the shared key and it is then filtered based on the privacy policy of the surveyed region. The
resulting sanitized video (SV) is sent back to the SS.
• UAS → SS : {Camera ID | E (V, K)}
• SS → PS : {Camera ID | E (V, K)}
• PS : D (E(V, K)) = V,
SV = Filter (V)
• PS → SS : {SV}
4.3.1 Data Encryption and Decryption
For the encryption, a simple block cipher mode with Advanced Encryption System (AES) is used.
Currently AES is considered the strongest encryption algorithm. To use AES for stream cipher,
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Figure 4.3: Block Cipher with CTR mode
Counter mode (CTR) is employed for its simplicity and efficiency. Counter mode works as illus-
trated in Figure 4.3 [29].
Counter mode turns a block cipher into a stream cipher. The counter is initialized to some value
and the successive values are typically generated by incrementing the previous counter value by
1 (modulo 2b, where b is the size of counter). Unlike other block cipher modes, the goal of the
counter mode is to generate a random key stream to be used for stream cipher. This is achieved
by encrypting successive values of the counter with the symmetric key. All plaintext inputs are
Exclusive-ORed with this key stream to produce ciphertext. During decryption process, the same
key stream is created and then Exclusive-ORed with the ciphertext to produce the plaintext.
The size of the counter value must be sufficiently large to avoid recycling because a reused counter
value could be used for a cryptanalysis attack. A 48-bit value can be used for this purpose. Given
the encryption block size of 128-bits (27 bits) and the bandwidth of a high definition video stream
of, for example, 4 Mbps (222 bits/sec), the video will generate 215 (= 222 /27) blocks per second. In
18
other words, the counter value will repeat after 233 seconds (= 248 /215), which will take more than
100 years even if the video is continuously transmitted without stopping.
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Chapter 5
TYPES OF DATA AND MULTI-LEVEL PRIVACY
UAS collects different types of data from various locations. For each type of data, there may be
different requirements for privacy protection. For simplicity, the type of data is limited to video
data. The video data input can be categorized into different levels and relevant privacy schemes
may be applied. With this scheme, the public can fine-tune their privacy preference.
5.1 Navigation-Critical Data
The data is categorized into navigation-critical data and navigation-neutral data. It should be noted
that navigation does not rely only on camera. In many cases, camera input is not used at all for
navigation [30]. The Sense-and-Avoid (SAA) functions do not use camera. The See-and-Avoid
function may use a camera, but it does not rely on a high-resolution camera like the surveillance
camera. For collision avoidance and navigation, only the general shape of the object, color, or
brightness levels are sufficient, thus low-resolution cameras may be sufficient.
5.2 Meta Data
Complete erasure of the video may be too limiting for the surveillance operation. Some level of
summary data may be released to the surveillance operator or the general public. For example, the
privacy-protected region may display a text output such as, “pool”, “bedroom”, “person sleeping on
the grass”, “person smoking”, or “man urinating”. High-quality meta data or summary data after
filtering may improve the utility of the surveillance operation. Navigation-critical video data can
also be transformed into a non-privacy invading forms, such as size, location, mobility, or meta data
forms.
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5.3 Levels of Privacy
The privacy requirements for video surveillance can be categorized as following. The default mode
can be set as 5).
1. No video or meta data allowed
2. No video allowed
3. Mosaic image allowed
4. Low-resolution video allowed
5. High-definition video allowed
Figure 5.1 illustrates the varying levels of video quality.
Figure 5.1: Varying Levels of Privacy
In some cases, people feel annoyed when a UAS flies nearby in low altitude. They should be able to
set the minimum distance from the location. For example,
1. More than 1000 feet
2. More than 500 feet
3. More than 100 feet
4. More than 50 feet
5. Landing allowed
The above rules can be applied only during a certain time period. Outside of this period, it could
fall back to the default privacy level.
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1. Applied at all times
2. Applied only at day time
3. Applied only at night time
4. Applied only in specific time or day
Table 5.1 shows a sample privacy policy database incorporating the multi-level privacy requirements.
Table 5.1: Sample Privacy Policy Database
Latitude Longitude Address Privacy Level Distance Time Period Target Type
X1 to X2 Y1 to Y2 234 Main St, Town, State Low res video >1000 feet only at night time Residence
X3 to X4 Y3 to Y4 987 Pool Ave, Town, State Meta data >500 feet only at day time Community pool
X5 to X6 Y5 to Y6 543 Some Rd, Town, State No video >100 feet at all times School play ground
X7 to X8 Y7 to Y8 775 What Ct, Town, State Low res video Landing allowed only at day time Park
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Chapter 6
PRIVACY PROTECTION FILTERING
Within the privacy server, the filtering module performs a filtering operation according to the privacy
database. The result of filtering may be blanking out the whole scene, blurring the scene, with mosaic
images, or scaling down the resolution. This video transformation could be applied to the entire
video image, or a small section in the video. There are three ways to apply the privacy policy as
follows.
6.1 Static Filtering
The privacy server keeps the privacy protection levels based on the location and the municipal
regulations. The UAS sends the information on camera’s view such as,
• Current location of UAS
• Camera direction
• Distance to the object
The UAS may also report the flight direction, so that the privacy server can predict the privacy level
change, and warn the UAS. Privacy server determines the camera’s field of view and the resolution
at the object. The resolution of the image at the target object should be determined in consideration
of the distance. Figure 6.1 shows two cases where the video resolution can be equivalent. It looks
up the privacy table, and applies necessary policy.
6.2 On-Demand Filtering
When a UAS is spotted taking video, a person concerned with his or her privacy may request not
to take the picture, or change the privacy level. Figure 6.2 shows a mock up mobile web page to
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Figure 6.1: Equivalent Video Quality
request privacy protection.
6.3 Processed Filtering
The privacy server employs advanced image processing algorithm, and actively processes the image
to search a scene that violates privacy even if it is not specified in the static privacy policy table.
When it detects one, such as someone urinating against wall, it takes a relevant action such as,
blurring the face of the person or replacing it with meta data.
24
Figure 6.2: Privacy Protection Request in Real Time
Chapter 7
GENERALIZED ARCHITECTURE
A single privacy server can not be used to communicate to all the UAS. Multiple privacy servers
are needed to achieve this task. The simple camera-to-privacy server model needs to be extended
to cover a large number of UAS and multiple privacy servers. A UAS should be able to connect
to any available privacy server and communicate efficiently. Figure 7.1 describes the generalized
architecture.
Figure 7.1: Generalized Architecture with Multiple Cameras and Privacy Servers
7.1 Encryption Key Distribution
Before starting the video surveillance operation, the camera and the privacy server need to share
a key. Key management can be an issue because there are multiple servers and clients. It is
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impractical for all the servers to keep the key information individually for thousands of cameras.
Therefore Kerberos model can be used for this process which is a key distribution protocol that has
been commonly used in network-based key distribution such as Microsoft Active Directory [29].
7.2 Kerberos
Kerberos is a service that is used for key distribution and user authentication between several clients
and servers. Kerberos provides a centralized key distribution server whose function is to distribute
session keys between the server and the client. It also authenticates the client to the server and
vice-versa. Kerberos is based on symmetric key encryption and does not make use of public-key
encryption.
The Kerberos Key Distribution Server is composed of two servers, an Authentication Server (AS)
and a Ticket Granting Server (TGS). Initially all cameras register their key at AS, and the Privacy
Servers register their key at the TGS as shown in Figure 7.2. The AS and the TGS also share a
symmetric key among themselves. After the initialization, the registered keys are never used for
data encryption, but used only for distributing the session keys.
Figure 7.2: Key Registration at Kerberos
Before the camera can establish a secure connection with the privacy server, it needs to communi-
cate with the AS and the TGS to generate session keys. Figure 7.3 illustrates the process of key
distribution.
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Figure 7.3: Key distribution in the field
• At the beginning of the surveillance operation, the camera contacts the AS as shown in step
(1).
• In step (2), the AS sends a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) to the camera which is encrypted
with the shared key between the AS and the TGS. The TGT contains a long-term session key
to access the TGS. The camera cannot decrypt the TGT.
• In step (3), the camera sends this TGT to the TGS.
• After validating the TGT, the TGS sends a short-term key to the camera to access the desired
privacy server in step (4). This key is also encrypted with the key shared between TGS and
the privacy server, thus preventing the camera to decrypt it.
• The camera now contacts the privacy server with this key in step (5).
• The privacy server authenticates a proper connection in step (6).
If the particular privacy server is busy, the camera can ask for a new ticket for a different privacy
server.
7.2.1 Exchange of Messages
Several messages are exchanged among the client (camera), AS, TGS and the server (PS) at different
phases of the process before the client and the server can authenticate themselves to each other and
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share a secret symmetric key. Table 7.1 shows the various messages exchanged during the process
[29].
Table 7.1: Summary of Kerberos Message Exchanges
(1) C → AS IDc‖IDtgs‖TS1
(2) AS → C E(Kc,[Kc,tgs‖IDtgs‖TS2‖Lifetime2‖Tickettgs])
Tickettgs = E(Ktgs,[Kc,tgs‖IDc‖ADc‖IDtgs‖TS2‖Lifetime2])
(a) Authentication Service Exchange to obtain TGT
(3) C → TGS IDv‖Tickettgs‖Authenticatorc
(4) TGS → C E(Kc,tgs,[Kc,v‖IDv‖TS4‖Ticketv])
Tickettgs = E(Ktgs,[Kc,tgs‖IDc‖ADc‖IDtgs‖TS2‖Lifetime2])
Ticketv = E(Kv,[Kc,v‖IDc‖ADc‖IDv‖TS4‖Lifetime4])
Authenticatorc = E(Kc,tgs,[IDc‖ADc‖TS3])
(b) Ticket Granting Service Exchange to obtain Service Granting Ticket
(5) C → V Ticketv‖Authenticatorc
(6) V → C E(Kc,v,[TS5 + 1]) (for mutual authentication)
Ticketv = E(Kv,[Kc,v‖IDc‖ADc‖IDv‖TS4‖Lifetime4])
Authenticatorc = E(Kc,v,[IDc‖ADc‖TS5])
(c) Client/Server Authentication Exchange to obtain service
Following notations have been used in the table to describe the process.
C = Client (Camera)
AS = Authentication Server
TGS = Ticket Granting Server
V = Server (Privacy Server)
Table 7.1 is divided into 3 parts to differentiate the exchange of messages between {C and AS}, {C
and TGS} and {C and V}. Following messages are exchanged during the process.
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Message (1)
C sends a message to AS requesting access to the TGS. The message contains the client ID (IDc),
ticket granting server ID (IDtgs) and a timestamp (TS1). The timestamp allows AS to verify that
the client’s clock is synchronized with that of the AS.
Message (2)
AS responds back with a ticket-granting ticket that is encrypted with the key derived from the
client’s password (Kc). The encrypted message contains a copy of the session key for C and TGS
(Kc,tgs), ticket granting server ID (IDtgs), timestamp (TS2), ticket lifetime (Lifetime2) and the ticket
to access the TGS (Tickettgs). The ticket (Tickettgs) is also encrypted with the key known to AS and
the TGS (Ktgs) and contains the session key (Kc,tgs). This allows a secure delivery of the session key
to both C and the TGS. The client ID (IDc) and the network address (ADc) are used to authenticate
the ticket.
Message (3)
C, now has the session key and the ticket. With these information, C sends a message to the TGS
that includes the ticket, requested server ID (IDv) and the authenticator (Authenticatorc). The
authenticator includes the client ID, client network address and a timestamp (TS3) and is encrypted
with the session key. The authenticator is intended to be used only once and has a very short
lifetime.
Message (4)
The TGS can decrypt the ticket as it already knows the key (Ktgs). It also decrypts the authenticator
with the help of the session key gained from the ticket. The TGS, then validates the client ID
and the network address in the authenticator and the ticket to authenticate the client. Once the
authentication is done, the TGS sends a service-granting ticket back to the client. The service-
granting ticket is encrypted with the session key shared by C and the TGS. It includes a new session
key to be shared between C and V (Kc,v), server ID (IDv), timestamp (TS4) and the ticket to access
the server (Ticketv). The ticket (Ticketv) also contains the session key (Kc,v), client ID, client
network ID, server ID, timestamp of the ticket and the lifetime of the ticket (Lifetime4). This ticket
is encrypted with the shared key between the TGS and the server (Kv).
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Message (5)
C can decrypt the service-granting ticket with the session key (Kc,tgs) to get the ticket to access the
server (Ticketv). C sends the ticket (Ticketv) and a new authenticator (Authenticatorc) to V. The
authenticator is similar to the previous one except that it is encrypted with the new session key
(Kc,v) and has a new timestamp (TS5).
Message (6)
V can decrypt the ticket (Ticketv) with its key (Kv) and gain access to the session key (Kc,v). It
can also decrypt the authenticator with the help of this session key and validate the information in
the ticket and the authenticator. If mutual authentication is required, V can send a message back
to C with the timestamp (TS5) incremented by 1. This message is encrypted with the session key
(Kc,v). Since, this message is encrypted with the session key (Kc,v), C can be assured that it was
created by V. The contents of the message confirm that it is not a replay of the authenticator.
Thus, by the end of this process, the client (camera) and the server (PS) share a secret key Kc,v.
This key, itself, can be used to encrypt the video stream from the camera to the PS or it can be
used to share a new key between the two.
7.3 Video Subscription Management
Independently from the encryption/decryption operation, it is necessary to decide who gets the
sanitized video stream. The owner of the camera can manage the access rights. At the time of
purchasing, he or she establishes the ownership and creates a management account. From this
account, he or she can allow the IP address or particular users to get the video image. The owner’s
surveillance station shall be obviously the first allowed machine, but he or she can also allow other
people to access the video.
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Chapter 8
ADVANTAGES
This proposed scheme has a number of advantages over conventional blanking technique.
8.1 Flexible Privacy Policy
The privacy policy for the proposed scheme is applied on the ground, unlike the blanking technique.
This feature gives an advantage in that the privacy policy can be modified in real-time when needed.
Based on the privacy policy, multiple levels of privacy can be designed depending on the sensitivity
of the region under surveillance.
8.2 Separation of Camera from Image Processing
The video image processing is done at a cloud-based server. So the owner of the camera does not
need to worry about upgrading the camera software. Advanced image processing algorithms can be
immediately employed without a camera software upgrade. Therefore, a relatively low cost camera
can be used for a longer period. Also, by sharing the common privacy server among multiple camera
owners, the cost for using the privacy server can become lower. This lowers the price of the system,
which may increase the adoption rate.
8.3 Legal Protection
If a surveillance operator uses an approved camera, he or she is better protected from a legal problem
because the compliance to the privacy policy is automatically ensured. Operators may prefer using
a compliant camera to their own non-compliant camera. For government entities, this could be a
great relief because they don’t become liable for privacy invasion. It is similar to the car-mounted
video camera in police cars where policemen can prove that they didn’t do anything illegal while
investigating an incident.
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8.4 Supporting Forensic Investigation for Privacy Violation
Since the video stream is monitored and archived at the privacy server while it is taken, real-
time compliance checking or auditing can be performed naturally. Upon any violation, the law
enforcement can investigate the incidents with the logged data. The logging data types, logging
process, and cryptographic verification process will have to be developed.
8.5 Availability of the Video Streaming to a Larger Audience
With the cloud-based privacy server model, video sharing becomes a natural built-in feature. It
allows real-time video sharing over the Internet with whoever is authorized to watch. For example,
in a kids’ soccer game, one person may fly a UAS taking video, and the video is fed to the privacy
server. The operator gives the account information to the parents who are watching the game, and
they all can watch the aerial footage without a hassle. Any unsuitable scene for young children or
private scene can be filtered out in real-time, so the whole family can enjoy the video. This video
can also be saved at the privacy server so that people can watch it later.
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Chapter 9
DISCUSSIONS
9.1 Need for Internet Connectivity
The greatest shortcoming with the proposed scheme is the need for constant Internet connection.
With the prevalence of the wireless Internet coverage, this shouldn’t be an issue normally. However,
in remote places where no wireless Internet is available, a backup method is needed. A mobile
privacy server can take a snapshot of the current privacy policy in the surveyed region, and sanitize
the video on the spot. This may work because there is probably less privacy concern in remote
places and the privacy policy is less frequently updated.
9.2 Denial of Service attack
A hostile entity may flood the privacy server with a large amount of traffic to create a Denial-of-
Service condition [29]. Any server on the Internet is vulnerable to this attack, and the privacy server
is no exception. Many techniques have been developed to thwart them and can be used to prevent
this attack.
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Chapter 10
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
UAS are the future of aviation. They can be used in a variety of civilian applications that are
beneficial to the government and the public. The number of UAS flying in the air is going to rise
enormously in the coming years. However, like any other technology, it can be misused to cause
potential harm to the public. The biggest threat from using these UAS into civilian applications is
regarding the potential impact they can have on privacy. These threats need to be neutralized if we
want to successfully integrate UAS into the civilian airspace.
In this thesis, various privacy policies, protection strategies, and technical solution for UAS-based
video surveillance were reviewed. Blanking technique with an on-board processing unit is currently
the most viable solution, but the high cost and the need for upgrading the privacy map and software
could slow its adoption. An alternative privacy-protection method with lower cost of implementation
was proposed as a solution. In this scheme, all video surveillance images are initially encrypted, then
delivered to a cloud-based privacy server through a surveillance station. The surveillance camera
and the privacy server share a common key that is used for encryption and decryption. The privacy
server decrypts the video using the shared key with the camera, and filters the video according to
the privacy policy for the target region. The sanitized video is sent back to the surveillance station
for further processing. This scheme can be extended to accommodate a larger system composed of
multiple cameras and multiple privacy servers. The key distribution problem can be solved using
Kerberos protocol.
Multiple privacy levels and different filtering strategies can also be handled through this method.
It has several advantages including lower system cost, applicability of advanced image processing
algorithms, legal protection for the UAS operators, and real-time streaming video availability to
general public on the Internet, all of which may promote a wide adoption.
As future work, advanced filtering algorithms that are better suited for the privacy policies can be
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developed to filter out unnecessary data from the decrypted video without the help of a human
operator. An implementation plan can be developed to test this scheme in a real life environment.
All the privacy protection and monitoring algorithms need to be implemented and tested in different
environments like in the lab and on the ground with mobile units.
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